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Subjects of Truth: Resisting Governmentality in Foucault’s 
1980s 
 
Abstract 
Responding to ongoing concerns that Michel Foucault’s influential governmentality 
analytics fail to enable the study of “resistance”, this paper analyses his last two 
lecture courses on “parrhesia” (risky and courageous speech). While Foucault 
resisted resistance as an analytical category, he increasingly pointed us towards 
militant, alternative, and insolent forms of counter-conduct. The paper 
comparatively analyses Foucault’s reading of Plato, Socrates and the Cynics, 
exploring parrhesia’s episteme (its truth-knowledge relations), techne (its practice 
and geographies), identities (its souls and its bodies) and its possible relations to the 
present. It concludes that Foucault viewed resistance as power, which 
problematized governmentalities but could also be analysed as a governmentality 
itself.. In pursuing parrhesia Foucault reaffirmed his commitment to studying 
discourse as always emplaced and enacted, whilst sketching out the geographies 
(from the royal court and the democratic Assembly to the public square and the 
street) that staged the risk of truth-talking. This suggests new subjects and spaces 
to open up political possibilities when exploring the geographies of 
governmentalities. 
 
Resistance is futile? Parrhesia as Governmentality 
Perhaps the most enduring critique of the work of Michel Foucault is that he paid insufficient attention 
to subjects and spaces of ‘resistance’. To many he is the “scribe of power” (Said, et al., 1993 [2004], 
214), drawing our attention to ordered Enlightenment discourses of historical knowledge, all-seeing 
panoptic forms of architecture, and the places in which subjects are made to care for themselves in 
line with broader governmentalities which work to stabilise and secure populations, economies and 
societies. This is in spite of the recurrence of seemingly resistant subjects and spaces throughout his 
work: the science-refusing insane, rebelling within the asylum; the criminal who resisted the 
panopticism of a disciplinary society; the sadist, the masochist, and the homosexual who refused what 
would later be termed ‘heteronormativity’ in spaces of sexual experimentation; and the much 
discussed insistence that power is everywhere accompanied by resistance (Foucault, 1979, 95; 
Foucault and Sassine 1979 [2016] 43; 1982 [2001], 346). The reason the latter are not taken to mark 
out Foucault as a theorist of resistance is that these subjects and spaces are often studied in the 
process of being normalised; as externalities which serve only to strengthen and refigure apparatuses 
of power (psychiatry, the criminal justice system, sexology and the bourgeois family, and theories of 
power themselves) in the moment of internalisation. Resistance, that is, becomes merely a 
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problematisation, a source for fine-tuning power and devising yet more ingenious imbrications of 
sovereign, disciplinary and bio-power into new governmentalities. This stands against standard 
definitions of resistance within geography, which identify it as the resisting of domination or 
oppression, building on well-established political movements (for instance Marxist, feminist or anti-
colonial) as inflected by the cultural turn, the study of ‘weapons of the weak’ and an emphasis on 
political identities (Routledge, 2009, 647, where Foucault is cited as encouraging the study of 
resistance as hegemony). 
To reduce Foucault’s engagements with ‘resistance’ to marginal subjects and abstract theorisations is, 
however, to caricature his long engagement with the question of power and its effects. His work on 
disciplinary forms of power retained a commitment to considering “plebeian” resistance to 
normalisation (Ransom, 1997) while he continued to consider rights as a basis from which to resist 
power relations of domination (Golder and Fitzpatrick, 2008). When he up-scaled from micro to macro 
interventions, from individual bodies into the population, he alerted us to forms of counter-conduct 
and alternative pastoral traditions (Foucault, 1977-78 [2007]). What the latter drew him towards were 
forms of self-making that refused societal norms and their attempts to fashion the individual. While 
he would retain his earlier interests in knowledge formations (refashioned as veridiction) and power 
relations (refashioned as governmentality), the last five years of his life saw Foucault focus on the 
making of the self (ethics) in relation to the making of others (politics). He suggested that the medium 
and object of self-other relations was ‘truth’: asking people what their truth was; ascribing them to 
regimes of truth; and encouraging practices which would embed them within bodies of truth. Making 
them, we could say, subject to truth (Legg, 2016). 
Foucault’s 1980s 
The majority of Foucault’s 1980s publications and recently published lecture courses yoked truth to 
power. They bring us to Greco-Roman inward-facing regulations of (male) sexual relations with bodies, 
wives and boys (Foucault, 1986b), considered through lenses of dietics, economics or erotics 
(Foucault, 1986a) as ‘care of self’, or to early Christian forms of baptism, penance and spiritual 
direction as genealogies of confession (Foucault, 1979-80 [2014]). This material is dazzlingly rich and 
shows how self-fashioning (the self on self), rather than more abstract notions of subjectification, 
helps us understand the capillary circulation of normalising power (see McGushin, 2007 and Raffnsøe, 
et al., 2016, chapter 10). But for those seeking evidence of the ever-presence of resistance to and 
within power, this material offers precious little to work with. 
Until, that is, one turns to Foucault’s last two lecture courses. In English they appeared as The 
Government of Self and Others (Foucault, 1982-83 [2010], henceforth referenced as GSO) and The 
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Courage of Truth (the Government of Self and Others II) (Foucault, 1983-84 [2011], henceforth 
referenced as CT). In them we see the truth-relations of self-making being studied not as inward-facing 
but as outward-glaring. Here self-other relations do not position the self as master/coloniser and the 
other as slave/colonised, rather the self under study is the intransigent subject, putting themselves at 
risk so as to, one might say, ‘speak truth to power’. The subject of both lecture courses is parrhesia in 
European antiquity, a “spidery” (GSO, 45) notion on the edges of western civilisation but one which 
involves a speaker exposing themselves to risk (from shame and demotion to ostracism, exile or death) 
in order to intervene in a particular period and place (CT, 9, also see Foucault and Burchell 2015). 
Here, at last, we have the resistant subject! God-shaming, empire-shaking, tyrant-challenging, and 
politics-claiming. That is, at least, until one reads the lectures. What we find there are parrhesiastic 
subjects that use their truth-talk: to found Athens; to be brave enough to govern well through the 
Athenian Assembly; to fearlessly advise tyrants on how better to sustain their empires; to refuse 
political service in favour of personal tuition; and, finally, we find the Cynic who choses militant and 
radical resistance to the satisfied norms of the people of the polis, but only so that he might save 
them. 
Does, therefore, parrhesia constitute ‘resistance’? In what follows I would like to suggest that Foucault 
refuses any easy elision of parrhesia and resistance; the latter term is almost entirely absent from the 
lectures (although see GSO 216, 286 and CT 258, 261, 300). Rather, what we see is that all forms of 
‘resistance’ are forms of power relation and, crucially, that this does not disqualify them from being 
politically transformative, radical or dangerous. Just as Foucault insisted that disciplinary power was 
‘productive’ rather than being ‘negative’, so what we might call resistance should also be viewed as 
‘productive’ rather than romantically and uniformly ‘positive’. What it produces are new reflections 
on how people relate to themselves, to others, and to their environments; making them, we could 
say, subjects of truth. 
After introducing literature addressing Foucault and resistance from within and beyond the 
geographical discipline, this paper will perform an analytical reading across the 1982-83 lectures 
(referred to as Self and Others) and the 1983-84 course (referred to as Courage of Truth). Rather than 
focusing on what Foucault termed political parrhesia, being the courage to ascend above the masses 
and govern well, it will focus on what Foucault termed philosophical parrhesia, which though less 
obviously political takes us closer to acts of ethical self-formation and what we could call resistance. 
The reading deploys analytical categories developed in governmentality studies (see Legg, 2016) to 
read across three foci of philosophical parrhesia (Plato, Socrates and the Cynics). Although Foucault 
refers more to government than governmentality in these lectures, he is explicit that this is a 
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continuation of his history of governmentality project (GSO, 42), connecting together the techniques 
of governmentality to modes of veridiction and practices of the self (CT, 8). The comparative reading 
below explores parrhesia’s episteme (its truth-knowledge relations), techne (its practice and 
geographies), identities (its souls and its bodies) and, in conclusion, its possible relations to the 
present.  
This reading contributes to ongoing efforts to appreciate the geographies of Foucault’s thought, and 
to consider how Foucault might help us think about geographies of power and resistance in ever more 
complex and useful ways. In his last two lecture courses Foucault reinforced his commitment to 
thinking about spatiality and placement, in both a more philosophical-methodological and a more 
empirical sense. 
First, Foucault reiterated his philosophical-methodological commitment to the materiality of 
discourse, analysing it through located and performing bodies. Foucault re-inserts thinking, speaking, 
threatening and moving bodies back into the history of philosophy. At the furthest extreme is the 
Cynic body: voluntarily homeless, naked, urinating in the street, and masturbating in the square. This 
was not in spite of, but to put into practice, their philosophy. Foucault’s ongoing project places 
‘abnormal’ bodies centre stage, analysing them with the rigour we would a state, corporation, policy 
or apparatus. The geographically and socially marginal figure becomes, again, Foucault’s perspective: 
“Cynicism would be the broken mirror, as it were, for ancient philosophy. It is the 
broken mirror in which every philosopher can and must recognize himself, in which 
he [sic] can and must recognize the very image of philosophy, the reflection of what 
it is and should be, and of what he is and would like to be. And at the same time, the 
philosopher sees in this mirror something like a grimace, a violent, ugly, unsightly 
deformation in which there is no way in which he could recognize either himself or 
philosophy.” (CT, 232) 
. The geographies of the latter are twofold. First, parrhesia’s risk emerged from its exact space of 
intervention (whether an Assembly, a royal court, a civic space [the agora], a temple, or the street). 
Second, parrhesia sought to change the world it intervened in to, taking aim at the city, the state and, 
even, the universe as the target of a courageous governmentality. In his last years, after a turn to 
sexuality and ethics which saw Foucault abandon the explicitly spatial work of his mid-career ‘power’ 
research (Howell, 2007), we find a thinker not just re-discovering the body as a site of truth and 
change, but re-discovering the spatial as a dimension through which power, subjectivity and, possibly, 
resistance came into being. 
Foucault’s Resistance 
Geographer’s resistance 
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Foucault’s influence on the discipline of geography has been profound (Crampton and Elden, 2007) 
although he has largely been read as a theorist of “power” and not of “resistance”, even when he is 
simultaneously read as insisting the two cannot be separated (Sharp, et al., 2000). While Foucault is 
used to open our eyes to new terrains in which power operated, and to show how this power was 
resisted, this often involved inverting the analysis of power rather than thinking about resistance in 
its own terms. That is, geographers have more often acted as parrhesiasts, identifying and challenging 
the working of power through the position of critique, rather than studying acts of resistance, and of 
parrhesiasts, themselves. 
Numerous studies have, however, resulted in productive engagements with the functioning and 
challenging of disciplinary and governmental spaces. These have included studies of power, friendship 
and resistance in early twentieth-century British housing reform (Robinson, 2000), of moving, evading 
and refusing bodies in the gay bars of mid-20th century Seattle (Brown and Knopp, 2016), of how 
labouring bodies in colonial Ceylonese coffee plantations evaded and resisted the panoptic gaze of 
the planter (Duncan, 2002), of the protesting, refusing and litigating prostitutes of interwar colonial 
India (Legg, 2014) and of ideological and street-based protests against the census in 1980s West 
Germany (Hannah, 2011b). 
While Foucault’s work on neo-liberal governmentalities has been extensively used by economic 
geographers, Langley (2007) is one of the few to think about subjects as agents in (if not resistant to) 
investment, through a reading of Foucault’s (1986b) The Care of the Self. Vasudevan’s (2015) study of 
contemporary occupations of urban space as protesting claims of rights to the city tellingly concludes 
with Foucault’s (CT, 340) analysis (of the Cynics) as creating other worlds via other lives. Within these 
examples we often find Foucauldian approaches used to explore resistance (bodies and power, 
subjugated knowledges, minor spaces, surveillance and citizenship) but rarely do we find Foucault’s 
work on resistance used itself (although see Hannah 2011a on welfare biopolitics and resisting modern 
governmentalities). Barnett (2015) has used Foucault’s 1980s work to help us rethink him as a 
(possible) theorist of resistance via problematizations. The frame here is explicitly not that of 
‘subjection/resistance’ but of always-changing selves who might transform themselves differently in 
particular, concrete circumstances. Rosol (2014) comes close to mobilising Foucault as a theorist of 
resistance in her work on counter-conducts of expert knowledge and the resulting struggles against 
zoning policies in contemporary Vancouver. In so doing she draws upon Cadman’s (2010) innovative 
paper which argued that geographers neglected the core role of counter-conducts, critique and the 
political in Foucault’s governmentality work, themes which have been more widely addressed outside 
of geography.  
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Resisting resistance 
There is certainly no consensus within the broader literature on the subject of Foucault and resistance. 
At best the consensus is that Foucault studied acts of resistance but resisted the analytical category 
of resistance itself. Žižek (2000), for instance, suggests that Foucault has two incompatible models of 
resistance (as pre-existing power or as being generated by it) which his work on self-formation in 
antiquity attempted to unite. Armstrong (2008) counter-argues that Foucault is actually creating an 
approach to freedom which equates it neither with liberation from power nor with pure rebellion; 
rather, it emerges in response to events and forces external to the subject; from, perhaps, one’s 
geographies. That is, if the historical ontology of power pushes us to name its historical-geographical 
specificities, then we must do so with resistance. Foucault was, however, willing to name contingent 
universals (see Koopman 2013) like governmentality and subjectivity, but less so with resistance. 
Cornell and Seely (2016, 53) contrast the embrace by queer theory of Foucault, for his radical assaults 
on preconceived connections between power, sexuality and resistance, with Marxist theorists of 
revolution who view him as a “major enemy” who sees no way “outside” of power. In another 
comparative reading, Smith (2016) recounts the contrast between Deleuze’s ontology, which was 
based on lines of flight and deterritorialisation, and Foucault’s, which tended to posit apparatuses first 
and resistance second. Dissatisfaction with his settling of the question of resistance and 
governmentality led to Foucault’s turn to ethics, with Smith posing the latter in the useful frame of 
reactive and active types of resistance (also see Checchi, 2014). While the former react against forms 
of power conceived of as external and are neutralised relatively simply, the latter are directed against 
oneself. This raises questions of what the subject could know (of episteme), of what they could be 
(identity) and of what they could do (techne). Being differently is here the active form of resistance; 
to be other.  
The challenge, however, is to consider how this personal ethics might be linked to political change. 
For Hardt (2010) accusations that Foucault’s capillary conception of power lacked an ‘outside’ from 
which to locate and direct resistance were a problem for orthodox Marxists and party-based politics, 
but not for Foucault himself, who continued to write about resistance and to campaign politically as a 
public intellectual (see Elden, 2016). Parrhesia emerged as the ethical and political mode of thought 
that would enable ways of thinking about struggle and politics. This may also have been a response to 
Foucault’s visits to Iran and his coverage of the Iranian revolution against both the Shah’s repressive 
regime and against western modernisation in favour of a “political spirituality” (cited in Raffnsøe, et 
al., 2016, 440).  
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For Cornell and Seely this work is indispensable for rethinking the notion of revolution, reintroducing 
an emphasis on self-transformation. Reading across Foucault’s writings on 1970s Iran and ancient 
parrhesia, the lesson they extract is that an overemphasis on the politics of liberation can distract 
attention from the ethical problem of freedom (Cornell and Seely, 2016, 77). Whilst domination must 
be resisted in the name of liberation, the gnarlier question of freedom demands ethical 
transformation which results, Foucault would insist, from the risky interaction of self and other. 
Foucault approached this question through, at least, three historical examples: the Cynics, critique, 
and counter-conduct. 
In terms of the former, Shea (2010, 173) attributes Foucault’s pursuit of the distinction between power 
relations and domination, and his commitment to studying the combatting of the latter, to his study 
of ancient ethical parrhesia, especially that of the Cynics. Shea clearly shows how Foucault linked the 
Cynic ethos to the emergence of critical philosophy in the Enlightenment (also see Raffnsøe, et al., 
2016, chapter 11). Contrasting with his early-career condemnation of Enlightenment’s tagging of truth 
to disciplinary policing of knowledge and bodies, Foucault embraced Kant’s (1784) question ‘What is 
Enlightenment’ as the moment when philosophy began again to criticise its material and 
contemporary reality, and to begin to intervene in it.  
At the level of individual de-subjugation, critique allows virtuous self-transformation which might 
expose the limit of the present, mining out ways of “not being governed” and questioning doctrinal 
truths, which owe their origins to the anti-pastoral (Reformation and counter-Reformation) 
movements of the 16th century as much as to Kant  (Butler, 2002). The source of resistance, in Butler’s 
reading, is not internal to the subject but emerges in failing projects of governmentalization. Butler 
(2016) has recently insisted that we think of resistance emerging from material spaces that enable 
embodied mobility (whether of amassed protesters or of queer performativities). This commitment 
to exposing and using resistance is a hallmark both of Butler’s Foucauldian sense of critique, but also 
of the exposed body most famously deployed in the ancient world by the Cynics.  
A third historical practice drawn on by Foucault (1977-78 [2007]) was that of 16th century Reformation 
practices of religious “counter-conduct”, his refiguring of resistance in the governmentality lectures 
(Davidson, 2011). If governed subjects consent to be so conducted, the possibility of refusal must be 
everywhere (Cadman, 2010). But Foucault resisted the language of resistance, referring to these acts 
as revolts, disobedience, insubordination or dissidence (Lorenzini, 2016). Rather, counter-conducts 
pursued other means of being conducted, through asceticism (abstinence), alternative communities, 
mysticism, the return to Scripture, or eschatological (‘end of times’) beliefs (for contemporary 
applications see Death, 2016 and Roy, 2018). Foucault would return to many of these practices in his 
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last lectures, not as acts of counter-conduct, but as the means by which early Christianity subsumed 
Cynic parrhesia.  
This paper is an attempt to explore some of these links. Ethical parrhesiasts proffer the possibility of 
an ethical subject who, while not political, sought to alter the city and its people through their spatial 
practice and their embodied truth. Through the Cynics’ grimace, Foucault aimed to fracture 
philosophy’s noble reflection and present an alternative genealogy of the relationship of truth, 
government and self. The sections below will seek out a reflection of resistance through providing, if 
you will, a threefold coming together of shards: 
 Plato Socrates Cynics 
Episteme: the will to Truth Philosophy into reality Ironic interrogation Changing truth 
Identity: the birth of two? Facing the tyrant The philosophical life The insolent life 
Techne: govern the city, 
govern the human 
Court City  Street and universe 
 
Table 1: three shards: analysing Foucault’s 1980s 
 
Philosophical to Radical Parrhesia 
In his research leading up to and including the Self and Other lectures, Foucault had tracked the urge 
not just to ‘know yourself’ but also to ‘care for yourself’ in the ancient world. His discovery had been 
that, way before Christian modes of confession and spiritual guidance, this caring had become a 
practice for two. The Other could be a friend, lover, or tutor, but their core quality had to be that of 
parrhesia, which enabled the self to tell the truth about itself (CT, 6). In the Self and Others lectures 
Foucault mostly focused on fifth century BCE Athens where he located the founding of parrhesia. To 
his surprise he found this founding parrhesia to be explicitly political. With the crisis of democracy in 
Athens (after the death of Pericles in 429 BCE) parrhesia shifted geography and target, from the 
Assembly and the citizens, to the royal Court and the Prince (the example of Plato in Syracuse, GSO, 
303) or the street and the people (the example of Socrates and the Cynics in Courage of Truth). Here 
the philosophical parrhesiast rose into prominence and presents something closer to the resisting 
subject for Foucault. The reading below follows Foucault in reading Plato ahead of his elder tutor 
Socrates, whose philosophical parrhesia absented itself more completely from the political through 
deserting the Assembly or the Court for the city. The question to which we will return in the conclusion 
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is: do these forms of parrhesia bring us closer to an analytics of resistance in the work of the latter, 
the last, Foucault? 
Episteme: the Will to Truth 
Plato: philosophy into reality 
What forms of knowledge can parrhesia draw upon when it leaves the constitutional form of 
democracy in the post-Periclean age, when public parrhesia and democracy in Athens was 
undermined? Foucault examined the parrhesia of Plato as philosophy in an intimate embrace with 
political sovereignty. What, then, makes this parrhesia, and not the truth form of the sage or teacher? 
It is parrhesia because this form of knowledge finds its truth in confronting power. Why, then, is this 
philosophical not political parrhesia? Because it alights upon a new target, the practices of the 
governor’s soul. 
Plato (428/7-348/7 BCE) was Socrates’ most famous student, recounting the latter’s teachings and 
formulating an ordered system of fundamental philosophy (metaphysics) and of political philosophy. 
However, Foucault chooses to focus on Plato as an itinerant and engaged philosopher, beginning with 
Plutarch’s account of him in the court of “the tyrant of Syracuse” (GSO, 48), Dionysius II, who ruled 
the Sicilian Greek colony from 367-356BCE. Dion, the brother of Dionysius’s wife, was a student of 
Plato and beseeched his ex-master to come to Syracuse and educate the tyrant ruler. The initial 
meeting was a disaster. Plato lectured Dionysius on the nature of virtue, courage and justice, and was 
promptly ejected from court (Dionysius actually asked that while departing Syracuse Plato be killed 
or, at least, sold into slavery). Dion denounced Dionysius’s behaviour, in an act described by Plutarch 
as parrhesia (GSO, 50). But for Foucault, Plato’s courageous truth-telling also marks a philosophical 
courage within a political frame. Dionysius later repented and Plato was recalled, although the visit, 
again, goes badly. Plato later reflected on this experience in his seventh letter, which for Foucault 
marks an attempt by a philosophical advisor to rationalise political action (GSO, 215).  
What forms of knowledge are at play here? Why does Plato keep returning to Syracuse? Foucault 
suggests that it is because he was a parrhesiast. Like Socrates and the Cynics, he wanted to change 
the world, not just change forms of thought. Unlike his mentor, Socrates, he did not feel he could 
operate his parrhesia within Athenian democracy, so he opted to influence society by directing a ruler. 
Whilst Plato desired a better-ordered world via affecting Dionysius’ policies, his motivation was also 
philosophical. Had he refused Dion’s request “… then he would feel that he, Plato, was only logos, 
pure and simple discourse, whereas it is necessary for him, he wants to try his hand at, to put his hand 
to the ergon (that is to say, to the task, the work)” (GSO, 225). For Plato this is where philosophy’s 
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“reality” was to be found: “How [Foucault asked], in what way, on what form is philosophical truth-
telling, the particular form of veridiction that is philosophy, inserted into reality?” (GSO, 228) The 
answer, for Plato, was that philosophy finds its reality when it addresses itself to whoever exercises 
power. Other ethical parrhesiasts would find their truths elsewhere. 
Socrates: ironic interrogation 
Socrates (c470-399 BCE) sits within the founding canon of western philosophy but is mostly known 
through the accounts of others’ (especially Plato) of his philosophical inquiries and interrogations. He 
was born around nine years after Pericles’ rule began, growing up during his 32-year reign (the ‘golden 
age’ of Athenian democracy), and surviving him by 30 years before he was forced to take his own life 
for supposedly refusing the truth claims of the Assembly and for his corrupting influence on Athenian 
youths, and some of its politicians. For Foucault, Socrates’ whole life is the playing out of a cycle 
between truth-telling and mortal risk, from his refusal to engage in Assembly politics because of the 
(bad) risk to his life, to his final acceptance of death for his beliefs (CT, 74). 
How does Socrates relate to truth forms? In one sense we have a familiar frame, from Foucault’s 
previous readings of Oedipus and his reading of political parrhesia in Euripides’ Ion in Self and Others; 
that of Apollo and the oracle at Delphi. On being asked which Greek was wiser than Socrates, the 
oracle had replied that there was none (CT, 81). Socrates’ whole life, the foundation of his braiding of 
truth and knowledge, was spent testing this oracular truth-claim through Socratic irony, through 
insisting he knew nothing as the basis for questioning what others knew. Subjecting Apollo to an 
interrogation, Socrates would spend his life testing himself and others, testing their knowledge, 
testing their patience, testing their ability to admit their own ignorance. This was his courage, the basis 
of his parrhesia, both irreducible to and inseparable from other forms of knowledge (CT, 87): from 
that of the sage (he knew the world but did not have geographical knowledge as his aim); from that 
of prophesy (he accepted but challenged Apollo); and from the knowledge of the teacher (he did not 
teach others what to know but what to do so as to learn). Related to these forms of knowledge but 
different, Socrates’ ethical parrhesia took place through the testing of souls. His episteme is to be 
found through his practice, through verification, testing, investigation, and examination (CT, 122); 
through both the identities and techne of his work. 
Cynics: changing truth 
Socrates chose democracy over autocracy, the people over the prince, but his philosophical parrhesia 
is still recognisably comparable to that of his student, Plato. The Cynic to whom Foucault turns most 
regularly, Diogenes (412/404-323 BCE), admired Socrates but loathed the abstractions of Plato, his 
11 
 
contemporary. He would disrupt his lectures, eating and drinking throughout and refusing his lessons. 
Plato branded him a ‘Socrates gone mad’. Diogenes was just one of the Cynics who lived as scandal, 
breaking the conventions of the polis through urinating, copulating, defecating in public, living in the 
street and castigating the citizenry. This was a way of touching on and exposing its taken for granted 
truths.  
Like Socrates, the Cynics are hard to analyse because of their dearth of written material. The added 
difficulty, unlike Socrates, is the diversity of Cynic figures to contend with, stretching from the fourth 
century BCE to the third century CE (CT, 193). The Cynic was diverse (courtly and crude), ambiguous 
(natural and abhorrent), non-theoretical yet learned, and left their record not through teaching but 
through (anti-)hero figures (CT, 210). Despite this, Foucault insists that the Cynics had a scandalous 
epistemic effect on the field of philosophy itself. The scandal was their life and their questioning, but 
also their approach to truth. Their practice issued a radical challenge to the tenets of philosophy: 
“What is the true life?” (CT, 218) To understand the originality of the Cynic answer, Foucault sketched 
out some generally accepted Greek philosophical approaches to what truth was, recurring amongst 
all the philosophers recounted so far, as illustrated through true speech, love and life (CT, 218-228): 
To be true  True speech True love True life Cynic Truth 
Not hidden Nothing withheld No subterfuge Unashamed Naked 
Pure No false opinion No displeasure No evil, no vice Destitute 
Straight Obeys the law Correct to custom Conform to norms Natural 
Unchanging Cannot be refuted Incorruptible Shuns corruption  Incorruptible 
 
Table 2: spoken, loving, living, and Cynic truth 
The Cynics worked against these definitions operating, again, under the shadow of Apollo’s light. After 
Diogenes and his father had been exiled from their homeland for counterfeiting, they visited Delphi 
and asked the oracle for advice. Apollo’s reply was: “Change the value of the currency” (CT, 226). 
Foucault’s interpretation is that the currency was that of truth itself, and that the epistemic project of 
the Cynics can only be understood through their embodiment of philosophical parrhesia as the way 
of discovering a new, true life (as in the fourth column above, explained below). As the philosophical 
tradition bolstered itself with the scientific logos of metaphysics, the philosopher’s body became an 
“increasingly pointless” shadow (CT, 236). Foucault aimed to restore that shadow to life. 
Identities: the Birth of Two? 
“Who is capable of being the artisan of parrēsia?” (GSO, 196) 
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Human subjects had always been at the centre of Foucault’s research. The insane, the patient, the 
convict, the sexual being, the lover of boys, the dreamer, the convert, the confessor, and the citizen 
had all been his subjects; identities as the target of governmentalities. In his final studies of parrhesia, 
however, Foucault’s gaze upon the subject shifts. No longer are we looking at the effects of power on 
a subject, of the conduct of conduct (governmentality) or the action of self on self (ethics). We are 
now looking at the interaction of self and other, with the emphasis lying on the other, the director of 
souls. Veridiction, government and self-constitution come together here but the subject of ethical 
formation is not the only subject present in this triangulation. Rather, knowledge here is also 
expressed by a truth-teller. Two corners of this triangle, self and other, enter into a relationship, united 
in the psychogogic (crafting the soul) project of the third corner, that of government.  
Plato: facing the tyrant 
In facing down a tyrant Plato was named as a parrhesiast. In this he was guided by his views of the 
masses, such as that expressed in his Republic (c. 380 BCE) that the body of citizens are like an animal, 
the angers and appetites of which had to be learned (GSO, 211-212). But there is also a different 
subject-relation apparent in Plato; the work of the philosophical advisor (other on self) on themselves 
(self on self); that is, the practice of philosophy through “exercises” (GSO, 242). Plato asserts that one 
can only acquire philosophy through living with it, through the relationship of self to self. The aim is 
to have a philosopher and a politician working together, the governor having a connection to 
philosophy, the governor being able to govern his soul truly so as to govern others justly (GSO, 295). 
This psychogogic relation emerges through having the self and other live their philosophy, a practice 
touched upon but not taken up through his lived body by Plato, unlike his mentor, Socrates.  
Socrates: the philosophical life 
“It is this domain of existence, of the mode of existence, of the tropos [manner] of 
life, on which Socrates’ discourse and parrhēsia will focus. So it is neither the chain 
of rationality, as in technical teaching, nor the soul’s ontological mode of being, but 
the style of life, the way of living, the very form that one gives to life.” (CT, 144) 
Socrates, like Plato, stood back from politics, though his position was that of absolute refusal, not of 
philosophy within politics. Like Plato, Socrates tested himself through ergon not logos, but he did this 
not just through who he chose to address in his practice, but also in his way of being. We come here 
to parrhesia as a way of life, of the philosopher as an agent of truth, through their dress, their 
behaviour, their body (GSO, 32).  
Rather than psychogogy, Socrates’ mission was that of caring for life, through the body. From here 
one philosophical tradition led to metaphysics and an ontology of the self (Plato), another led to forms 
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of life and the art of oneself (Socrates, CT, 127). The route to identity in parrhesia could come through 
discourse. Nicias explained to fellow Athenian statesman Laches, before he embarked on a dialogue 
with Socrates over the nature of courage, that the philosopher would force him to given an account 
of himself, the kind of life he had led in the past and led currently, which Socrates would then examine 
and test, in a parrhesiastic pact of courage between self and other (CT, 143). How do you live? 
McGushin (2007, 63) shows that this is not the demand for a confession, but a confrontation aimed at 
encouraging both resistance and care. Socratic parrhesia, for Foucault, constituted existence as an 
aesthetic object, a beautiful work, which demanded care so as to form one realisation of the true life 
(CT, 162). 
Why did people accept this questioning by Socrates? Because of the second route to identity in 
parrhesia, that of the parrhesiast’s body. Laches accepted Socrates’ questions on courage not because 
he was courageous, but because of his ‘symphony’, a harmony between what he said and the 
unpretentious and unadorned way in which he lived. Both the target and the means of ethical 
parrhesia is life itself. Whilst for Socrates parrhesia was a challenge to those with whom he entered 
into dialogue, parrhesia also aimed to increase their care for themselves. The courage of Socrates was 
to make people care (CT, 158). The Cynics were inspired by Socrates’ binding of modes of life to truth 
telling, but they felt bound to push the connection to the level of “intolerable insolence” (CT 165).  
Cynics: the insolent life 
“With the Cynics, a naked, begging, and bestial life, or a life of shamelessness, 
destitution, and animality looms up on the borders of ancient philosophy…” (CT, 
270) 
For Foucault both Cynic and Socratic parrhesia arose from their immediate linking of mode of life and 
truth-telling (CT, 237). Both believed philosophy should prepare one for life, that it should make one 
care for their life, that one should study life in its reality, and that one should live according to one’s 
philosophy. But, in addition, the Cynics added the principle of ‘changing the currency’. This involved 
challenging what constituted the true life in the sense of embodiment, and in terms of mode of 
existence. 
In terms of embodiment, the Greco-Roman Cynic was the scout of humankind, moving ahead of it and 
assessing its dangers. This temporal, future-function required a spatial and contemporary roving. The 
Cynic would be without a shelter, a home or even a country (CT, 167). After mobilising his body, the 
Cynic then spoke of what he had seen, without fear. The Cynic body, though wild, was also codified, 
signified by the cloak, staff, bare feet and pouch of the beggar, unkempt and homeless (CT, 170). These 
elements enabled the Cynic in their search, they reduced their pointless obligations, and they exposed 
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life in all its bare, true nakedness. The body of truth here becomes visible, laughable, through bare 
life; the corporeal, scandalous truth of the Cynic. 
This mode of life was courageous because of its exposure of the Cynic body, in the sense of display 
and of risk (CT, 234). But the Cynics also challenged the very notion of a true life. Theirs was referred 
to as a dog’s life (an epithet Diogenes took up with pride). They were without shame or modesty. They 
were destitute and indifferent. They were ‘natural’ lives, barking at enemies, distinguishing the good 
from bad with their senses. But they were also guard dogs, dedicated to saving others. Shameless, 
indifferent, discriminating and guarding, Foucault sees these characteristics as changing the currency 
of the true life (unconcealed, pure, straight and unchanging, see Table 2). This was not through 
reversing or challenging the true life, but through taking it to its scandalous conclusions. Take the 
unconcealed life to its extreme and you have the shameless, exposed body. The independent life, 
which needs nothing, becomes the indifferent life of voluntary poverty. The straight life becomes the 
barking discrimination between good and bad. The unchanging, incorruptible life becomes that of the 
guard dog (CT, 244). 
Of the four components of the true life this latter part was associated by Foucault with sovereign life. 
That is, the unchanging life of self-possession, of being in a position to help others, of displaying to 
others the best of mankind (CT, 270-272). In scandalising the sovereignty of the true self the Cynics 
performed their most radical manoeuvre. While Plato had sought to govern the sovereign, the Cynics 
declared themselves sovereign and philosophically deposed their political kings. The most famous 
examples are the result of the, probably mythical, debate between Alexander the Great, ruler of 
Greece, and Diogenes, wretch who lived in the street. While Alexander’s sovereignty required an 
army, that of Diogenes required nakedness. While Alexander had inherited his sovereignty, Diogenes 
had made his himself. While Alexander vanquished political enemies, Diogenes had vanquished his 
own faults and vices. While the King could lose his kingdom, Diogenes would be king, in nature, 
forever: “The Cynic is the only true king. And at the same time, vis-à-vis kings of the world, crowned 
kings sitting on their thrones, he is the anti-king who shows how hollow, illusory, and precarious the 
monarchy of kings is.” (CT, 275) A life of battle, of struggle with the self and for others, theirs is the 
“militant life” (CT, 283). 
Techne: Govern the City, Govern the Human 
“What mode of knowledge, or what tekhnē, what theory of practice, what body of 
knowledge, but also what exercise, what mathēsis and askēsis will make it possible 
to take up this parrēsia?” (GSO, 196) 
15 
 
If the epistemic form of parrhesia directs us towards the specific and the contingent, how was truth 
operationalised in philosophical parrhesia? It operated through exposing the speaker to risk (GSO, 56), 
creating with the listener a “dramatics of discourse” (GSO, 68) in a particular scene. This is its 
geography: “… the irruption of the true discourse determines an open situation, or rather opens the 
situation and makes possible effects which are, precisely, not known.” (GSO, 62)  
Plato: court 
The scene of Plato’s parrhesia is given as much emphasis in Foucault’s account as the dramatics of his 
courageous speaking. Whereas previously the scene was that of the democratic city and of citizens, 
now it is of the autocratic court and the philosopher, of the prince and his advisor. Plato finds 
abundant evidence of bad parrhesia in Athenian democracy, of un-directed free speech, of un-
controlled desires, of an absence of true discourses (GSO, 199-200). In the non-democratic Persian 
Empire of Cyrus, in contrast, he sees a leader distinguishing those worthy of friendship and of speech 
(GSO, 202, on the reflections on colonialism and governmentality in these lectures see Legg, 2018). In 
the context of declining Greek city-states and democracies and the formation of Hellenistic 
monarchies, “Although municipal democracy may still function, the main political problems will be 
shifted from the agora, which is, so to speak, municipalized, to the sovereign’s court. The scene is now 
the sovereign, the court, the sovereign’s entourage.” (GSO, 210) But, vitally, Plato’s object was still 
the good governance of the city, although he felt the realities of his context meant that the best way 
to affect the city was through advising the tyrant, not through imagining ideal republics. As Foucault 
proposed, “… I think that if the logos is in fact related to the construction of the ideal city, then the 
ergon, which must complete the philosopher’s task with regard to politics, is actually the task of the 
political counselor and of the elaboration, through the Prince’s soul, of the rationality of the real 
conduct of the city.” (GSO, 219). 
How, then, would Plato would enact the dramatics of his parrhesia; what would his advice be to the 
various Syracusans who asked for his views? Foucault warns the reader that, on the face of it, Plato’s 
advice is a banal and uninteresting disappointment (GSO, 260). What we get are general treatises on 
philosophy not politics, on the moral not the political, on prioritising justice, reconciliation and 
friendship. This is Plato as diagnostician, analysing the failure to create trust within the Sicilian Empire, 
and encouraging comparisons with Persian and Athenian imperial governmentalities. While advice 
upon structuring the networks of empire was given, Plato’s techne is routed through the Prince, his 
geography confined to the court unless the ruler acts upon his advice. 
Socrates: city  
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The body and identity of ethical parrhesiasts was, to a great extent, their techne. But there is an 
ambiguity in Foucault’s reading regarding the utility of these works, especially regarding the city. We 
are told that the emphasis has moved from the city and the citizen to the individual and their conduct 
(CT, 34). But we are also told that parrhesia “… has, of course, something to do with technique, but it 
is also a role which is useful, valuable, and indispensable for the city and for individuals.” (CT, 14) 
Socrates presents himself, in contrast to those trained in the arts of rhetoric and addressing the city, 
as the man of truth-telling without any tekhnē (GSO, 312, 336). Yet his mode of parrhesia was to tour 
the city, freely giving advice, acting as the irritating gadfly that would rouse the Athenian population 
from their slumber. 
While he felt the risk of parrhesia in the Assembly would not have been useful, due to the state of 
politics at the time, he felt his touring of the city could help the people. This is why, in Plato’s Apology, 
Socrates insists that he can be most useful to the city by not serving it politically. As Foucault 
ventriloquised Socrates: “By encouraging you to take care of yourselves I am useful to the whole city. 
And if I protect my life, it is precisely in the city’s interest. It is in the city’s interest to protect the true 
discourse, the courageous veridiction which encourages citizens to take care of themselves.” (CT, 90) 
Socrates aimed to cure the city of its ills, not as Plato did through advising the governor, but through 
working for the moral health of the citizens (CT, 110). The techne that Socrates appeals to is that of 
the technician of care, of the therapist of the soul (CT, 134). This techne intervenes not in the polis, 
we could say, of politics, but into the city of bodies and souls (GSO, 327). 
Cynics: street and universe 
Foucault presented us with two geographies of the Cynics, the first spanning his last two lecture 
courses, the second coming as the culmination of his final course. The former geographies concerned 
the city, the latter concerned the universe and the prospect of an Other life. 
The materiel for the Cynic’s scandalous assaults was the city. It provided them with the weapons and 
infrastructure for their militant life: “an overt, universal, aggressive militancy; militancy in the world 
and against the world.” (CT 285). While the Cynics rejected the politically sovereign life, they also 
rejected the conventions and laws of the city (the polis, GSO 287). They rejected the most basic 
divisions of urban space (public/private) by living in the street and conducting their dangerous work 
there (“The Cynics are men of the street, of the agora” GSO, 291, also see CT 253). While Plato had 
withdrawn to the Court, the Cynics remained men of the city. This question of the techne of this truth-
telling, of the application of ethical parrhesia was central: “What is the site of truth-telling? Where can 
truth-telling find its place, on what conditions can and must room be made for it?” (GSO, 305). 
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This question was taken up again in the Courage of Truth lectures, drawing on accounts of the Cynics 
posted on street corners, in lanes and at the doors of the temple, practicing a “popular philosophy” 
(CT 203-4). But the emphasis in these final lectures moved from the micro to the macro geographies 
of Cynic parrhesia. This move was from the sites of truth-telling to its object. At what did the Cynics 
aim with their assaults? What did they hope to affect, through their bodies and those of their targets? 
For Foucault, Cynics used their embodiment of the true life to insert a radical otherness into the city. 
This would not raise Plato’s question of an other world, an ideal or metaphysical realm that was 
elsewhere. It posed the other life in the here and now, as an immediate way of changing a place 
through caring for the self differently (CT, 245-6).  The exposed, destitute, barking, sovereign life of 
the true-king Cynic was, therefore, exposed as a life of dedication to relentless public work of self on 
self, of caring through diatribe and attack (CT 278-9). What was under attack was not just individual 
vice but the vice of humankind in its real life, which could only be changed by altering its customs, 
conventions and ways of living (CT 280, 294). Free of commitments the Cynic “… appears as a sort of 
universal night-watchman who keeps watch over the sleep of humankind… The Cynic is a functionary 
of humanity in general; he is a functionary of ethical universality.” (CT 301) By freeing himself of 
domestic ties to the geographies of the city, the Cynic could attend to universality of all humans, to 
“… the government of the universe.” (CT 303) 
 
Conclusions: Parrhesia as Resistance in the last Foucault? 
The vertigo of a familiar past 
Despite the antiquity of his materials, Foucault returned to presentist pointers throughout the 
parrhesia lectures (“... to try to justify constantly enclosing you within ancient philosophy” CT, 174). 
He recapped this work as “obviously a sort of prehistory” of practices which later emerged around 
other famous sets of couples, namely: the penitent and the confessor; the guided subject and the 
spiritual director; the sick person and the psychiatrist; the patient and the psychoanalyst (CT, 7 also 
see Foucault and Burchell 2015, 220). The last lecture course opened not with the ancient world but 
with material on Kant and critique, and Foucault suggested repeatedly that the Enlightenment saw 
the re-emergence of parrhesia after centuries of dormancy. The site, and cause, of this hibernation 
was the Christian Church and, especially, its yoking of the disruptive potential of parrhesia to the 
command “tell me who you are”. 
Foucault’s argument here positions the Courage of Truth lectures as leading, chronologically, to his 
arguments made in the Government of the Living (Foucault, 1979-80 [2014]) course, four years 
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previously, which described the truth regime of early Christianity (see Foucault 1981 [2014] and Legg, 
2016). Foucault now suggested that around the second century CE Christian teaching took over the 
parrhesiastic function from the Cynic tradition and divested it of its philosophy (GSO, 348-50). A new 
relationship of the true life via Christian asceticism resulted that would renounce the world in devotion 
to an other world; that of heaven. This would in general mark a geographic turn inward to the 
monastery away from the risks and lives of the city. Foucault suggested that he planned to lecture on 
the turn from pagan to Christian asceticism in the following year’s lectures, and hinted at what they 
might have covered; he died three months later. They would have touched on shared practices of 
ascesis (modes of endurance and exercise) in terms of food, fasting and diet (in which Christians were 
more radical than Cynics), in terms of scandalous indifference to others, and in terms of an animalistic 
naturalness of life (CT, 317-8). What was new in the Christian asceticism was the emphasis on the 
other world, of heaven, as the target of the other life and a new emphasis on obedience to god, to the 
law, and to one’s master: “There is true life only through obedience to the other, and there is true life 
only for access to the other world.” (CT, 320). The Platonic metaphysical other world and the Judeo-
Christian emphasis on the pastorate inflected Cynic asceticism within this new Christian truth regime. 
Parrhesia transitioned here from talking to others to talking to God, proving obedience to him (CT, 
330). It would continue as a courageous boldness, but mainly in defending God’s faith against 
doubters. Individual scandalous boldness, Foucault suggested, became clouded over by the 
governmentalities of the Christian church: 
“And this theme of parrhēsia-confidence will be replaced by the principle of a 
trembling obedience, in which the Christian will have to fear God and recognise the 
necessity of submitting to His will, and to the will of those who represent Him. We 
will see the development of the theme of mistrust of oneself, as well as the rule of 
silence.” (CT, 333) 
Bold, brave closeness to God now came to seem like arrogance and presumption; truth would come 
from a director, via institutions like monasteries, churches and the pastorate more broadly. These, for 
Foucault, are the mechanisms of claiming and shaming philosophical parrhesia: 
“Parrhēsia appears incompatible with the severe gaze that one must now focus on 
oneself. The person who can bring about his salvation—that is to say, who fears God, 
who feels himself to be a stranger in the world, who keeps a watch on himself, and 
must constantly keep a watch on himself—cannot have that parrhesia, that jubilant 
confidence by which he was bound to God, borne up to grasp Him in a direct face-
to-face encounter. So parrhesia now appears as a blameworthy behavior of 
presumption, familiarity, and arrogant self-confidence.” (CT, 334) 
After fearless speech 
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This was the message Foucault delivered in his last lecture. What we are presented with is the 
subjugation of militant, scandalous Cynic parrhesia, submitting to the demand “tell me who you are.” 
Foucault is regularly criticised for his refusal to condemn the ethos of the governmentalities he 
described, whether of Taylorisation, famine policies, or neo-liberalism. But the language here, of 
trembling obedience, submitting to His will, and blame-worthy self-confidence, suggests a genuine 
regret at the cowing of the Cynic. 
 Yet, unlike in his previous courses, Foucault repeatedly suggests that this subjugated tradition 
survived in diverse practices, including the Christian counter-conducts mentioned above (CT, 182, 
337). Perhaps Foucault’s most unexpected suggestion was that this trans-historical Cynicism could 
also be found in modern politics (for a retrospective reading of Foucault's earler works in the light of 
his last, see McGushin, 2007). Here Foucault was thinking foremost of nineteenth-century 
revolutionary movements which, he suggests, took from Cynicism the idea of a mode of life as “… the 
irruptive, violent, scandalous manifestation of the truth …” (CT, 183). Revolution here was organised 
through secret societies, social organisations, and as a style of existence which embodied the other 
life, which is true life, to the point of being willing to die for the truth.  
Shared across these suggested survivals of the Cynic mission were the commitment to a militantism 
which, crucially, demanded personal renunciation and destitution so as to battle to change the whole 
world (CT, 286). That is, each of these seemingly individualistic forms of resistance seeks to change 
the world. Though viewed as personal relations (ethics), they have a relationship to a truth-knowledge 
claims (veridiction) and the conduct of others (power). That is, they can be viewed themselves as 
governmentalities that seek to make better geographies, which “… transpose[s] anew the idea of an 
other life into the theme of a life whose otherness must lead to the change of the world. An other life 
for an other world.” (CT, 287, emphasis in original). Central not marginal, these militant subjects 
merited Foucault’s full attention as vital governmentalities because (not in spite) of resembling what 
we might call ‘resistance’. 
Casting back, therefore, how can these works of the last Foucault on parrhesia help us with the 
hackneyed but vital question of resistance and the ongoing challenge of analysing governmentalities 
spatially? In terms of the former, Foucault clearly continued to resist the term, or offer an historical 
ontology of what resistance is or was, but he did brand Cynic parrhesia as scandalous, intolerable, 
militant and radical. While Plato and Socrates seem less obviously resistant, Foucault insisted that they 
were also parrhesiasts, though through what we might call elite ‘policy advice’ and individual therapy 
rather than systemic challenge. Reading across his three parrhesistic foci, the first lesson is that 
approaching parrhesia as a form of power (whether political or as a more dispersed ethic of care) does 
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not mean that it was neutralised or compromised; as contestation it could still have the power to 
mobilise, to inspire, to discipline a movement, or to plan an alternative future. In this sense we can 
view acts we might label resistant as alternative acts of power (within broader counter-conducts or 
critiques) that should be studied using the full analytical range of governmentality studies, much as 
we would a state, corporation, policy or apparatus. The second lesson is that when seemingly resistant 
acts become problematized and neutralised (such as via Cynic subsumption into Christian truth 
practices) these subjugated practices can survive and re-emerge in new and vitalised ways and forms 
(via the Reformation, the Enlightenment, or revolutionary militant lives). 
In terms of geographical analysis, the reading above has highlighted the value of the last Foucault 
lectures in both a philosophical-methodological and an empirical sense. The lectures affirm Foucault’s 
commitment to tracing governmentalities genealogically, through bodies in particular spaces, acting 
on freedoms and constraints that emerge through the dramatics of discourse, as mobilised by 
thinking, moving, speaking, and corporeal bodies. From Plato’s exercises of philosophical interaction 
with his subjects, to Socrates’s roving, ironic interrogations of Athenians’ ways of life, to the vulgar 
challenges to privilege and entitlement barked out by the Cynics, the forms of truth, knowledge and 
power here are inseparable from their materiality, their embodiment, and the reality of their location. 
Foucault provides us with rich empiricaly detailing of these geographies. These range from medium 
scale analyses, such as from the democratic city to the authoritarian court, or the debates about how 
best to order Mediterranean empires so as to govern well and truthfully. 
But it is the geographies of the city that are most often invoked here, of Socrates haunting bakeries 
and docks, testing himself and others in the everyday spaces of Athens, or of the Cynics living without 
shelter in the street and the square. In the later, Christian period, parrhesiastic practices would, 
Foucault suggested, leave the people of the city and withdraw to the hermetic spaces of the 
monastery and the cloister. This movement would disrupt the geographical connection between the 
micro and the macro, which the Cynics had attempted to enact in the public spaces of the city. While 
they had attempted to make another world in the city, Christian thought would discipline the body on 
the promise of an other-world in an after-life.  
Foucault’s last lectures provoke us to rethink the influence of governmentality studies within 
geography and to apply and test it in new ways. They reinforce long-standing campaigns within and 
beyond geography, which insist that we study knowledge and truth claims as embodied and materially 
manifested, with all the potential for insurgence and creative disruption this focus allows. They remind 
us that risky truth-telling can take place within seats of power, whether as policy advice, expert 
testimony or judicial witnessing, as well as in radical spaces of alterity. The post-Enlightenment 
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genealogy of parrhesia Foucault sketched out suggests that we might profitably consider the 
parrhesiatic geographies of militant activists, whether in a squat, camp, or coordinating hub, as ethical 
spaces, linking protesting bodies to virtual yet actualisable other worlds in the here and now. 
What is clear is that spaces of resistant acts were vital to Foucault’s understanding of the world, but 
that he resisted resistance as an analytical frame for linking governmentalities and political change 
because of its binary tagging to liberation or rebellion. While insisting we pursue public liberation from 
domination, his lesson was that freedom must also be sought within the individual, so as to 
complement systemic challenges to ingrained injustice. To study these resistant acts as power, as 
parrhesia, is to acknowledge their fragile vulnerability to internalisation and neutralisation and their 
potential as future and insolent governmentalities. 
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